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In his searing novel of the violence at the heart of the building of the American West, Blood 
Meridian, Cormack McCarthy depicts individuals who both relentlessly pursue their own 
enrichment, and yet regularly engage in actions that are both inexplicable and self-destructive.  This 
raises the question as to the role of incompetence, misjudgment, opportunism and failure at 
formative times of institutional building and change.   
  
A focus on the distribution, rather than the efficiency, aspects of institutions highlights their 
inherent fragility (Thelen, 2010, 54).  Actors will constantly seek to test or renegotiate any 
compromise, and there is the omnipresent threat of alternative or reformed coalitions of interests 
presenting themselves (Thelen, 2010: 54; Hall and Gingrich, 2009).  Meanwhile, historical 
institutionalism highlights the importance of power and politics within institutional arrangements, 
which provide opportunities and constraints on social action.   Even in times of ‘critical juncture’, 
institutions and politics both evolve in ways that follow a particular logic, following on the 
structural context (Thelen, 2010: 55).  Both these approaches conceptualize attempts to change 
institutions as the product of logical processes, representing either rational calculations or 
contextually logical products of historical circumstances.  
 
Most strands of comparative institutional analysis stress the duality of institutions and social action, 
with each influencing and remoulding the other, stretching back to the works of Georg Simmel 
(Jackson, 2010; Lane and Wood, 2009); it is also generally considered that social action constitutes 
a process that is at least partially reasoned and thought through.   Historical settings frame actors’ 
interests and actions: actors may both reinforce the rule book and seek to depart from it (Jackson, 
  
2010).  The literature on comparative institutional analysis has tended to focus on collective action 
by actors. However, it is recognized that more coordinated settings strengthen collective ties within 
and between actors (Lane and Wood 2009).  In liberal markets, where owner interests predominate, 
a greater range of opportunities are presented for entrepreneurial actions by individual players (c.f. 
Dore, 2008).   
 
Actors can be seen as ‘creative political schemers’, rather than ‘acting out the parts the theorist has 
set for them’ (Crouch, 2009: 87).  However, the extent to which actors may be incompetent or 
bungling in their schemes, and the extent to which such incompetence and bungling may have far 
reaching consequences for institutions is often underestimated. Endogenous approaches to 
understanding systemic change suggest that continuity is secured by ‘skillful’ actors who use their 
existential material and/or political advantages to prop up and secure their positions; challengers 
seek to contest this in a ‘strategic dance’, characterized by shifting tactics (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012: 84).  It could be argued that disorderly or chaotic change may represent not only shortfalls in 
capabilities and judgments on the behalf of both agents of continuity and change.  Exogenous 
conceptualizations of change focus on relatively unusual external shocks; such circumstances open 
up particular opportunities for ‘skillful’ actors to remake the system in their own interests (ibid.). 
Once they have secured their position, then the new order is rapidly bedded down. However, a 
failure to capitalize on this opportunity may make for an extended period of disorderly systemic 
flux.  Beckert (2013) argues that in times of uncertainty, actors are particularly likely to imagine or 
have fictional expectations about what the future may be like. With fiction come narratives, which 
can become self-fulfilling; they serve the interest of the speaker without necessarily mapping out an 
advisable path or ensuring future stability and growth (ibid.).    At the same time, the manner in 
which such narratives unfold may represent a sharp departure from past trajectories; the choices 
made by actors may be difficult to predict. 
 
Above all, Brexit should be seen in such a light.  While it would be difficult to completely 
deconstruct the actions of two key players, the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the 
leader of the Brexit campaign, Boris Johnson, widely repeated theories in the media suggest two 
dimensions.  Firstly, Cameron had embarked on the gamble of holding referendums as a means of 
solving or kicking into the long grass persistent challenges or dilemmas; this included electoral 
reform, the Scotland referendum and the Brexit one. Inevitably, as with a gambler who tosses the 
dice one too many times, bad news presented itself.  Secondly, Johnson seems to have hoped to 
burnish his credentials with the Tory rank and file through leading his campaign to a narrow defeat, 
without having to face up to the challenges Brexit would bring.  The outcome was one neither 
  
individual appears to have anticipated nor had plans to manage.  Not only will Brexit fundamentally 
change the impact of supra-national EU institutions on UK regulation and governance (with knock 
on effects on nested national and sub-national institutions (c.f. Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997), but 
it also places into renewed question the survival of the United Kingdom as a single political entity.  
The scheming of more minor actors in this tragedy is an equally dismal story, but there are many 
more subplots of miscalculation, wrong headedness, willful stupidity and petty treachery. Even less 
inspiring is that some of the investors who lavishly funded the Brexit campaign were the same who 
bet against the pound (Johnson et al. 2016), in other words, actively working to bring about 
economic disruption in order to profit through it.  Quite simply, British institutions will undergo 
fundamental change, and this change has not been brought about by the rational calculations of key 
actors, nor does it represent a successful example of premeditated opportunism.  
  
While Brexit was marked by elite failure and bungling, it was an elite that expressly excluded the 
intellectual classes. This is not to suggest that, as with any other ideology, neo-liberalism does not 
have its fair share of prophets. However, an increasingly forceful political narrative in Liberal 
Market Economies has been a disdain for intellectual thought, evidence based compromise and 
qualification (Massey, 2000; Rigney 1999; c.f. Etzioni, 2006). As Priestland (2010) has pointed out, 
elites can be divided into three categories: the rich/owners of capital; militarists and intellectuals.  
Only when the last are taken seriously – which normally only follows after a period when other two 
elite segments are completely discredited – is there a basis for durable social compromises, and for 
political elites to be held properly to account. The failure of the intellectual elite to make themselves 
heard above the noise of the Brexit battle is part of a particularly worrisome trend.   On one hand, it 
was an easy and cheap shot for political elites arguing for Brexit to state that we have had enough of 
intellectual elites in the form of experts (many of whom, as Grey (this issue) notes, probably now 
have to enact a policy they did not vote for or believe is realistic). Academics are rarely successful 
in making their increasingly complex insights accessible to a mass audience, despite increasing 
exhortations to be impactful beyond academia. This arises in part because much academic energy is 
diverted to securing peer reviewed publications, while even potential informed readers are 
increasingly prepared to read only short digests conveying unambiguous messages even if the 
research on which it is based does not support such an unequivocal conclusion. On the other hand, 
in hankering after simplistic solutions for complex problems by disregarding the insights of experts 
is a direction in which lies populism, the mob, and worse.  As such, the wider public are vulnerable 
to misinformation and downright lies promulgated by other elites. The relative weakness of 
intellectuals in Liberal Markets would reflect the extent to which the other two elite categories are 
relatively powerful in such contexts.  Intellectuals, through their (unbiased) scientific knowledge, 
  
are able to speak truth to power not least in the development of  policy based on objective evidence, 
without which policy actions may well make situations worse. Truth was a particular casualty in the 
claims made by both protagonists and antagonists in the Brexit debate. 
 
Bressand (1979) notes that elite incompetence is often associated with a wider sense of unease 
about life and change. It has been argued that the 2008- financial crisis was itself an example of 
elite failure; the latter had become hubristically detached from the complexities and contradictions 
of the financial ecosystem (Engelen et al., 2012). In turn, the underlying roots of the crisis at least in 
part lay in the elite enclosure of increasing amounts of the commons, and rising social inequality 
(Savage and Williams 2008).  Lupia and Johnson (2001) conclude that behind destructive 
referendum outcomes often lies elite maneuvering and misjudgment, while Morgan (this issue) 
identifies elite fragmentation. In other words, elite failure helped sow the seeds of the Brexit crisis, 
which were reaped by means of elite bungling. More broadly speaking, the central theoretical lesson 
of the Brexit debacle is that systemic change is not always calculated nor best serving the interests 
of change agents or of the wider national well-being; institutional regimes may be endangered 
through elite incompetence, even if only by a small handful of individuals.  Change under such 
conditions is likely to lead to particularly unpredictable outcomes. 
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